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Abstract: This thesis is interested in the conditions for retailers who request financial 
assistance from the bank. The bank evaluates the payoff ability of the retailers based on 
the marketing influence and the leadership status. To examine the impact of these two 
measurements on the bank’s decision, the problem is modeled using three different 
games: 1) Supplier Stackelberg; 2) Retailer Stackelberg; 3) Nash equilibrium. Based on 
the optimal solutions, I conduct sensitivity analyses and use empirical evidence to 
illustrate the impacts on prices, demands, and profits of the retailer and the supplier, as 
well as on the bank’s revenue and the retailer’s financing cost. Results show that as 
more effort the retailer puts on promoting its marketing influence, its profit first 
increases and then decreases. However, the financing cost keeps increasing. Besides, 
when the retailer is the supply chain leader, it gains a high profit and a low financing 
cost. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Bank loans are the predominant source of external financing for many firms in the 
modern corporate landscape. The Canadian Bankers Association (CBA; 2016) shows 
that bank financing represents almost 70% of all lending supplied to the business sector 
through business loans, short-term promissory notes, and other lending products. It is, 
therefore, important to determine which factors ultimately influence the credit-risk 
assessment of firms by banks. In theory, many factors can affect a bank’s decision to 
extend financing to a firm. In reality, banks look at the total package (e.g., business plan, 
cash flow projections, sales, marketplace analysis, business viability) as well as the 
company’s ability to repay a loan when making lending decisions. Interestingly, most 
of those factors can be recognized as either financial or operational aspects of the firm 
and, hence, can be classified as parts of the overall supply chain financing (SCF) pattern 
of a firm, a rapidly developing area of both finance and operation research. 
Understanding the financing implications of SCF is particularly important for retail 
firms; they are heavily supply-chain dependent and in an industry with a very thin profit 
margin, which makes them more susceptible to financial distress. For instance, Nine 
West Holdings, Inc. filed for bankruptcy in March 2018 with debt of over $1.5 billion 
(Globe & Mail, 2018). As part of the debt restructuring deal with creditors, the company 
plans to sell assets to generate fire-sale cash flows. The story is similar for other debt-
ridden retail firms. In the midst of uncertainty in the retail environment, banks can be a 
reliable source of financing. This is because banks, as expert monitors and information 
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powerhouses, can accurately assess the impact of various financial and operational 
aspects of the firm on its credit risk and going-concern viability. In this thesis, I focus 
on a retailer’s downstream market power, which I denote as marketing influence, and 
upstream market power, which I label as the leadership status of the retailer within the 
supply chain, and examine how the interactions within the supply chain of a retailer 
influence its credit-risk assessment by banks.  
I am interested in the conditions for retailers with financial constraints that request 
financial assistance from the bank. Obviously, the bank will evaluate the payoff ability 
of the retailers. I focus on factors of the payoff ability of retailers: the retailers’ 
marketing influence and the pricing leadership status. The rationale for considering 
these two factors is that as competition intensifies, gaining market power to become a 
leader in the market can be significant in seeking assistance from the bank. Not only 
does the firm have the ability to set the price, but it can also expand its market share. 
Naturally, when the bank proposes the interest rate in response to a retailer’s loan 
request, it will evaluate the retailer’s payoff ability based on something it can observe 
or measure, such as the retailer’s marketing influence and the leadership status. The 
bank will also adjust the offer of interest rate based on these factors. In this research, 
the impacts of a retailer’s leadership status and marketing influence on the bank loan it 
can secure are examined. 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the impact of a retailer’s marketing 
influence and leadership status in a supply chain on the financial assistance that it can 
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receive from the bank by addressing the following interesting issues:  
1) to study how the marketing influence can affect both operational and financial 
performance of a retailer in a supply chain under three different game sequences, 
and further investigate the impact of marketing influence on the bank loan that 
the retailer can secure; 
2) to identify the relationship between bank loan and the retailer’s supply chain 
leadership status by assuming that the bank loan is the only source of external 
financial for the retailer.  
A basic model is developed in which a single-period cash flow model for a supply 
chain is considered: a supplier supplies a product to a retailer that needs financial 
assistance to obtain the products from the supplier in order to sell them to the customers. 
To ensure receipt of the bank loan, the retailer must promote the products and store 
images to gain more marketing influence. The level of effort the retailer puts into its 
marketing influence can be observed by customers and will affect their purchasing 
decisions. The bank will evaluate the payoff ability of the retailer based on two 
measurements: the retailer’s market power and its leadership status in the supply chain. 
To examine the impact of these two measurements on the bank’s decision, as well as 
prices, customer demands, and profits of each member in the supply chain, the problem 
is modeled using three different games: 1) the Supplier Stackelberg game, in which the 
supplier is the leader and the retailer is the follower; 2) the Retailer Stackelberg game, 
in which the retailer is the leader while the supplier is the follower; 3) the Nash 
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equilibrium game, in which the supplier and the retailer have the same levels of market 
power. Based on the optimal solutions under three different supply chain structures, I 
conduct extensive sensitivity analyses and use numerical examples to illustrate the 
impacts of marketing influence, leadership status, and other factors on prices, demands, 
and profits of the retailer and the supplier, as well as on the bank’s revenue and the 
retailer’s financing cost. 
This study yields several interesting results. First, when the retailer puts more effort 
on promoting its marketing influence, its profit first increases and then decreases. This 
implies that it is not always the case that the more investment on promoting the 
marketing influence, the more benefit the retailer can gain. The retailer should balance 
the benefit from marketing expansion due to the promotion against the cost. Second, 
when the retailer invests more in marketing influence, the financing cost will be higher. 
To highlight the value of supply chain leadership, this study compares the retailer’s 
profit and financing cost under three games that are widely used in the literature. 
Derived results show that when the retailer is the supply chain leader, it benefits from 
high profit and low financing cost. The underlying rationale is that the retailer can 
always benefit from being the first mover by setting the price; however, it gains the least 
profit when it is as the second mover.  
In addition, built upon theoretical results derived from models, I propose several 
hypotheses. Empirical evidences have also been presented to support theoretical results. 
To verify the results derived from models I developed, empirical studies are included in 
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this thesis that use financial information of suppliers and their customers (retailers) over 
300 industries, for the period 1950 to 2017. Various measurements have been identified 
as the independent variables, such as the retailer’s initial investment on marketing 
influence and the level of retailer’s marketing influence that customers can observe; 
measurements for the dependent variables are also identified: the retailer’s profit and 
financing cost. The regression model as a tool is first applied for the deep analysis. The 
empirical results support the proposed hypotheses on the impact of different factors on 
retailer’s profit and financing cost. 
This study contributes not only to the literature, but also the practice:  
1) In terms of the academic study, this research combines the aspects of both 
operational and financial research and studies how the nature of supply chain 
(market power) can affect the profits of the firms in the supply chain, and further 
affect the ability of the retailer to obtain a loan from the bank. In addition, differing 
from most of the literature, which focuses on either theoretical models or empirical 
approaches, this research uses empirical evidence to support the theoretical results; 
2) From the perspective of practical applications, this thesis takes the real business 
issues into consideration and proposes that the interest rate offered by the bank to 
the retailer depends on the performance of the retailer, such as its leadership status 
in the market and its effort on marketing influence. Again differing from other 
studies, mine provides additional managerial insights to the executives by 
investigating the influence of the firm’s performance under three different games: 
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1) the Supplier Stackelberg game; 2) the Retailer Stackelberg game; 3) the Nash 
equilibrium. In this way, this research identifies the optimal bargaining strategies 
for retailers under three supply chain structures. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 represents the literature 
review. Chapters 3 & 4 describe the model and discuss results on the retailer’s profit 
and its financing cost under three different supply chain games, and proposes the 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 empirically tests these theoretical hypotheses proposed in 
















Chapter 2 Literature review 
In this thesis, the focus is to examine the impact of market power on firm’s profit 
and financing cost in a supply chain. The literature review presented in this chapter will 
focus on studies on two main research streams: the market power and supply chain 
finance. Table 1 outlines issues corresponding to each of these two main research 
streams. 
Table 1. Issues corresponding to each of two main research streams 
Research streams Issues 
Market power relationship 
Market power in general 
Market power on firm’s financial performance 
Market power on firm’s operational 
performance 
Supply chain finance 
External bank credit financing (BCF) 
Internal trade credit financing (TCF) 
Comparison between BCF and TCF 
2.1 Market power relationships 
In this subsection, I will review the relationship on the market power. Studies in the 
literature can be classified into three issues: market power in general, market power on 
firm’s operational performance, and market power on financial performance. 
2.1.1 Market power in general 
 Market power plays a significant role in both operational and financial areas as it 
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can affect both the firm’s order quantity and profits in a competitive market. Existing 
literature has defined market power and examined the impact of the market power and 
its measurements for different types of products in different markets. 
 Keeley (1990) finds that banks with more market power tend to hold more capital 
relative assets while they have a lower default risk. Berger (1995) explains the profit-
structure relationship in banking and compares the market-power and efficient-structure. 
Stephen (1993) indicates that the market share itself is not a reliable indicator of market 
power and more factors need to be considered in different situation. In addition, he 
shows that the barriers to entry, instead of market shares, are the key to the market power. 
 More studies in the literature measure the market power under different product 
market. Pauly (1988) tests the details of monopolistic market power in health insurance 
markets. He concludes that the role of monopolistic power in the medical service market 
can increase rents of an insurer with market power. Borenstein (1989) estimates the 
significance of route and airport dominance in discovering the level of market power in 
an airline industry. The results reveal that the ability to mark-up price above cost can be 
significantly influenced by an airline's share of passengers on a route and at the endpoint 
airports. Besides, Ohno and Gallagher (1992) measure the market power for Japanese 
soyabean markets. The data proves that there was market power in the Japanese 
soyabean wholesale market after the US embargoes. The estimates show that Japanese 
consumers lose $376 million during this episode, and most of which was transferred to 
the importers. Sexton and Zhang (2001) test the impact of food industry market power 
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for U.S. consumers. Results indicate that even the modest market power can enlarge the 
food marketing to capture more shares of the market surplus. However, efficiency 
(deadweight) loss is small unless the level of market power is high enough or if it is 
exercised at multiple stages of the channel. Nevo (2001) empirically examines this 
finding. He concludes that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing 
behavior. Leading firms have the right to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products 
and influence the perceived quality of the products by the customers.  
 Differing from the above studies, I identify the supply chain leaders and followers 
by measuring the market power for retailers and their suppliers in the empirical studies 
in this thesis. To be more specific, I measure the market share of each firm as an 
indicator of the market power.  
2.1.2 Market power on firm operational performance 
Stackelberg model is commonly used in studies in economics and supply chain 
management. In this subsection, I will review the literature that uses Stackelbeg strategy 
as a tool to analyze different market conditions. 
 Leitmann (1978) extends the theory of Stackelberg strategy to a nonunique ‘rational’ 
response of the follower. This practice guarantees the leader of Stackelberg strategy a 
cost value that cannot be exceeded. In that way, he defines a generalized Stackelberg 
strategy pair. Sherali et al. (1983) study the existence and uniqueness of a Stackeiberg-
Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Sherali (1984) presents a model with multiple leader 
Stackelberg that extends the Stackelberg’s leader-follower duopoly and discusses the 
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existence of uniqueness and computation of an equilibrium solution. On the top of that, 
Basar and Srikant (2002) develop a Stackelberg network game with a great number of 
followers. They consider a hierarchical network game with a single service provider, 
and a large number of users with multiple levels. As a result, they show that the game 
can have a unique equilibrium solution. He et al. (2007) study sequential decision 
making in the supply chain management and marketing channels by testing the 
Stackelberg differential game models. Moreover, Huck et al. (2001) find that 
competition will be less intense for Stackelberg markets when firms remain in pairs.  
 For the applications of the Stackelberg models, Yu et al. (2009) discuss how the 
vendor can take an advantage by using a Stackelberg game to increase his own profit in 
a vendor managed inventory (VMI) system. The results indicate that: (1) the 
manufacturer (vendor) can benefit from his leadership by enhancing its profit in the 
VMI system; (2) market and raw material related factors have crucial influence on the 
net profits of the manufacturer and each retailer. Furthermore, Liu et al. (2012) study 
the two-stage Stackelberg game models to investigate the impact of competition and 
consumers’ environmental awareness on key supply chain players. Qin et al. (2007) 
study the coordination of volume discounts and franchise fees in a system that consists 
of a supplier and a buyer with price-sensitive demand and analyze the problem as a 
Stackelberg game. Furthermore, Zhang et al. (2013) formulate the problem of optimal 
decisions between the manufacturer and the retailer in two different games: Stackelberg 
game and cooperative game. They propose a new method in terms of coordinating the 
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supply chain that both the manufacturer and the retailer have the power to share each 
other’s advertising costs. 
 Different from the above studies, I compare three games, the Supplier Stackelberg, 
the Retailer Stackelberg, and the Nash game, to examine the impact of retailer’s 
leadership status on its loan from the bank in a supply chain framework with a supplier 
and a retailer. I also develop hypotheses based on optimal solutions to these games and 
use data to verify the validation of the models. Detailed discussions are presented in 
Chapter 3. 
2.1.3 Market power on firm financial performance 
 Pricing strategy is proved to be a useful tool in the supply chains and has been 
widely applied in markets. Pricing strategy is one of common strategies that firms use 
for gain competitive advantages. This subsection reviews the pricing strategy used in 
supply chain and how it affects the firm’s financial performance. 
 Yao and Liu (2005) study the price competition between a retail and an e-tail 
distribution channels under two market game settings: the Bertrand and the Stackelberg 
price competitions. They show that there exists an optimal wholesale price for each 
market structure that can be used to encourage the retailer to accommodate to the 
additional e-tail channel. He et al. (2009) investigate the cooperative advertising and 
pricing in a dynamic stochastic supply chain. Cai et al. (2009) evaluate the influences 
of price discount contracts and pricing schemes under the dual-channel supply chain 
competition. They show that the scenarios with price discount contracts can perform 
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better than the non-contract scenarios under the Supplier Stackelberg, the Retailer 
Stackelberg, and the Nash game theoretic perspectives. In addition, they show that 
consistent pricing scheme can reduce the channel conflict and earn more profit to the 
retailer. Also, Chen et al. (2012) examine a manufacturer’s pricing strategies in a dual-
channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer 
is a follower. They show that both the manufacturer and the retailer prefer a dual-
channel supply chain under certain conditions. Besides, Wei and Choi (2010) explore 
the application of a wholesale pricing and profit sharing scheme (WPPS) for 
coordinating supply chains under the mean–variance (MV) decision framework. They 
prove that there exists a unique equilibrium of the Stackelberg game with WPPS in the 
decentralized supply chain. Dan et al. (2012) use the two-stage optimization technique 
and Stackelberg game to examine the optimal decisions on the retail services and prices 
under both centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chain. The results indicate 
that retail services affect the manufacturer and the retailer’s pricing strategies a lot. On 
the top of that, Lan et al. (2018) test the manufacturer’s optimal pricing strategy in a 
dual-channel supply chain. The result shows that both the manufacturer and the retailer 
can be benefited by the dual-channel system benefits if the level of demand uncertainty 
is greater than a threshold. Fang et al. (2017) propose a one-leader-one-follower 
Stackelberg (OLOFS) game model with multiple eavesdroppers. They use the optimal 
power allocation and pricing strategy to maximize the players’ utilities. The result 
indicates that the proposed game model improves network energy efficiency. Besides, 
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Madani and Rasti-Barzoki (2017) study the pricing policies, greening strategies and 
governance tariffs under supply chains competition. The results demonstrates that 
cooperating between members makes more profit for them and produces more eco-
friendly products. 
 In my thesis, I model the retailer’s market power as the pricing bargain ability in 
the supply chain and use Stackelberg model to test how the market power can affect the 
optimal solution of the retail price as well as wholesale price. Details can be referred to 
Chapter 3. 
2.2 Supply chain financing 
 The integration of supply chain management and finance has gained more attention 
recently. There are two general streams that have been extensively discussed: external 
bank credit financing (BCF) and internal trade credit financing (TCF). This subsection 
will review the literature related to these two streams and the comparison between them. 
2.2.1 External bank credit financing 
 From a bank’s perspective, credit risk management is essential to the long-term 
success of organization. In general, banks will make decisions on whether or not to lend 
money to the company after making a credit risk analysis. Banks will not offer their 
financial assistance if they notice the lending behavior cannot generate any revenue. 
 Many studies have been on the credit risk and credit scoring for both banks and 
consumers. Hand and Henley (1997) review statistical classification methods by using 
consumer credit scoring. Thomas (2000) shows that credit and behavioural scoring are 
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two most important forecasting techniques that can be used in the retail and consumer 
finance areas. For credit scoring, Lee et al. (2006) use classification and regression tree 
(CART) and multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) to explore the 
performance of credit scoring. The results reveal that, CART and MARS are more 
accurate than traditional discriminant analysis, logistic regression, neural networks, and 
support vector machine (SVM) approaches.  
Some studies discuss the bank loan under certain different environments. Qian and 
Strathan (2007) suggest that under strong creditor protection, loans tend to have more 
concentrated ownership, longer maturities, and lower interest rates. Moreover, they find 
that the impact of creditor rights on loans depends on borrower’s characteristics, such 
as the size and tangibility of assets. In addition, Bharath et al. (2011) conclude that even 
firms can borrow from multiple outside financial assistance, borrowing from a previous 
lender will gain better loan terms. 
There are also some reported studies on specific cases or evidences on bank lending. 
Ivashaina and Sharfstein (2010) show that new loans borrowed by large firms decreased 
by 47% during the financial crisis. In particular, authors show that banks will stop 
lending if they have better access to deposit financing. Lummer and McConnell (1989) 
find that banks can be transmitters in capital markets, but new bank loans do not 
communicate information at all. On the top of that, Diamond (1991) finds that 
borrowers with middle level credit ratings rely on bank loans.  
In this thesis, I address a problem in which the retailer has to consider finance 
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assistance from the bank to make the order from the supplier. In return, the bank will 
evaluate the payoff ability of retailer based on its market power and supply chain 
leadership status.  
2.2.2 Internal trade credit financing 
Trade credit financing (TCF) is another popular topic in recent years. Many studies 
have been proposed to examine this issue between suppliers and retailers because trade 
credit is always linked to the solution of financial constraints. Practice shows that trade 
credit is a crucial tool for financing growth. A properly prepared financial plan can be 
helpful for retailers to negotiate with suppliers. In this thesis, I focus only on the 
applications of trade credit and its guarantee contract between a supplier, a budget-
constrained retailer, and a bank.  
 Chen and Cai (2011) extend the model in the supply chain with a supplier, a budget-
constrained retailer, a bank, and a 3PL firm. They conclude that the control role model 
has higher profits both for the 3PL firm and for the entire supply chain and has a better 
performance for the supply chain as long as the 3PL firm’s marginal profit is greater 
than the supplier’s marginal profit. Cai et al. (2014) find that retailer prefers trade credit 
when the trade credit market is more competitive than the bank credit market. Besides, 
the study of credit guarantee contract in a capital-constrained supply chain has been 
presented by Yan et al. (2016) and Kouvelis and Zhao (2016). Yan et al. (2016) show 
that the partial credit guarantee contract can maximize the profit based on a suitable 
guarantee coefficient. On the other hand, Kouvelis and Zhao (2016) focus on the 
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contract design. The finding of their study supports the use of revenue-sharing contracts 
under decentralized supply chains. 
 In my model, trade credit condition is not considered for the retailer. Instead, I 
assume that if the retailer is on a budget constraint and needs a financial support, it can 
borrow loan from the bank rather than negotiate with the supplier for a late payment. 
2.2.3 Comparison between BCF and TCF 
 BCF and TCF have been compared in the existing studies (for example, Kouvelis 
& Zhao, 2012; Cai et al., 2014; Jing & Seidmann, 2014). Some studies show that TCF 
is a better option than BCF under certain scenarios. For instance, Kouvelis & Zhao 
(2012) and Cai et al. (2014) show that the trade credit performs better than bank loan 
from the perspective of supplier. Moreover, Jing & Seidmann (2014) study a two-level 
supply chain coordinating with manufacturers and budget-constrained retailers. They 
find that TCF is more effective than bank credit when production costs are low while 
BCF is more effective when production costs are high. On the top of that, Chen (2015) 
examines a distribution channel with one manufacturer and one capital-constrained 
retailer. Results show that trade credit benefits both manufacturer and retailer more in a 
wholesale price contract. Besides that, he shows that trade credit is a better method to 
coordinate the channels by centralizing the finance distribution from the manufacturer. 
For credit risk of small firms, Nilsen (2002) finds that trade credit is widely used by the 
small firms suffering the loan decline. 
2.3 Limitation of previous research 
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 In this section, I identify the research gaps and summarize as follows. 
1) In most cases, the information about financial performance for a budget-constrained 
retailer is assumed to be common knowledge to the potential creditor (bank). But in 
practice, the retailer sometimes has more precise knowledge than creditors. For 
example, it might hide data and records that could negatively affect the bank’s 
decision on loans. Therefore, in this research, I take the common information 
between bank and retailers into consideration and propose my model for it; 
2) In certain conditions, the customer’s perception of a product may be affected by the 
retailer’s advertising and promotion activities. In other words, customer’s 
purchasing decision is related to the retailer’s efforts in promoting its product. 
However, current research has not addressed this aspect. In my research, I develop 
the mathematical model in which customer’s demand is related to the level of 
retailer’s investment in promoting its market influence and product image; 
3) Most of the research concerns coordination of supply chain between suppliers and 
retailers. However, few studies include the role of the bank in the supply chain or 
investigate how the bank will behave under different supply chain structures. In my 
research, I combine the operational and financial aspects of the supply chain and 
study how the bank reacts to the performance of retailers in different scenarios; 
4) Most of the research tests the theoretical results by applying numerical examples. 




Chapter 3 Model description 
3.1 Overview 
Consider a simple supply chain, in which a supplier provides a single product to a 
retailer who will sell the products to the customers. It is assumed that retailer will need 
to spend more money on relationship-specific assets to promote its marketing influence 
in order to gain more market power. 
The objective of this study is to investigate how the retailer’s market power affects 
the bank’s loan rate in a supply chain framework. The retailer has to consider financial 
assistance from the bank as it cannot afford the order payments to the supplier. However, 
the bank will evaluate the payoff ability of the retailer based on its market leadership 
status and its initial investment level on promoting its marketing influence. Hence, the 
bank’s interest rate is assumed to be dependent on both the retailer’s initial investment 
on promoting its marketing influence (for example, the investment on store or product 
image) and leadership status in the supply chain.  
3.2 Model description 
In the supply chain, the supplier produces the product with a unit production cost 
(𝑐). To simplify the model and focus on the analysis of the impact of the retailer’s market 
power on the bank loan’s interest rate, I normalize unit production cost (𝑐) to be 0. The 
robustness checks shows that this assumption does not affect the major results and 
insights of this study. The supplier should decide the unit wholesale price (𝑤). The 
retailer should predetermine the level of marketing influence (𝛼) it will invest, where 
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0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1. Following studies of Anderson et al. (1997) in marketing, I assume that the 
retailer’s cost of initial investment in marketing influence is  𝐶𝐼 =
1
2
𝑘(𝛼)2, where 0 <
𝑘 ≤ 1, a constant parameter, representing an accelerating rate in this investment cost. 
In the supply chain, pricing leadership also reflects the market power in terms of bargain 
ability. Three supply chain games between the supplier and the retailer are examined: a 
simultaneous game (Bertrand-Nash game, denoted as 𝐵), a game with the retailer as 
the price leader (Retailer Stackelberg, denoted as 𝑅), and a game with the supplier as 
the price leader (Supplier Stackelberg, denoted as 𝑆). I denote the supply chain’s price 
leadership relationship as 𝑙 = {𝐵, 𝑅, 𝑆}. Since the bank loan depends on the retailer’s 
market power and leadership, the interest rate (𝑟) of the bank’s loan can be written as:  
𝑟 = 𝑟0 −  𝜃𝑙 − 𝛿𝛼,              (1) 
where 𝑟0  is the bank’s initial interest rate without considering the factors of the 
retailer’s market power or leadership status; 𝜃 (𝜃 ∈ (0,1)) and 𝛿 (𝛿 ∈ (0,1)) are the 
weights that bank perceives on the retailer’s leadership in the supply chain and 
investment in marketing influence, respectively. Notice that 𝑟0 >  𝜃𝑙 + 𝛿𝛼 to ensure a 
positive 𝑟. Equation (1) indicates that if the retailer plays a Stackelberg leader in the 
supply chain or/and if the retailer initially invests heavily in the marketing influence, 
the bank will offer a lower interest rate for the loan. To sell the products to the customers, 
the retailer should decide the retail price (𝑝). Fig. 1. illustrates the framework of bank 




Fig 1. Framework of bank debt financing 
To capture the retailer’s pricing leadership in the supply chain, I assume that 𝑙 = 1 
if the retailer is the Stackelberg leader; 𝑙 = 0 if the retailer plays Bertrand Nash game 
with the supplier; 𝑙 = −1 if the supplier is the Stackelberg leader. 
 It is also assumed that the retailer’s marketing influence level affects the 
customer’s decision on purchasing the products. The intuition is that when the customer 
observes the retailer has more marketing influence, he/she is more likely to be a loyal 
customer of the retailer and more likely to have a high willingness-to-pay (WTP). Let 
𝑠 represents the level of bargaining power for retailer that customers can perceive. Then: 
𝑠 = 𝑏𝛼,                 (2) 
where 𝑏 ∈ (0,1), the degree of importance that the customers perceive the retailer’s 
marketing influence.  
Assuming that customers are heterogeneous in product valuation, 𝑣 , which is 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, as in other studies in the marketing literature 
(for example, Chiang et al., 2003; Choudhary et al., 2005). Knowing the retail price (𝑝) 
and observing the retailer’s level of bargain power, the customer’s utility function is: 
21 
 
𝑈(𝑣) = 𝑣 − 𝑝 + 𝑠.              (3) 
The customers with valuation 𝑣 on the product will buy the product if 𝑈(𝑣) ≥ 0; 
otherwise, the customers will not buy the product. Then, the demand (𝐷) can be derived 
as:    
𝐷(𝑝) = 1 − 𝑝 + 𝑠.              (4) 
To be cost efficient, the supplier is assumed to produce exactly the number of 
products that the retailer needs. That is, production quantity is equal to the retailer’s 
order quantity, in order to meet the customer’s demand (𝐷). 
The notation used in this research is summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Table of notation 
Index 
l             Retailer’s leadership status 
S,R,B        Superscript, index of the Supplier Strackeberg, Bertrand-Nash game, and 
Retailer Stackelberg supply chain, respectively 
S, R          Subscript, index of the supplier and the retailer, respectively 
Parameters 
𝑣 The customer’s valuation on the product, random variable, uniform distribution [0,1] 
𝐷 Retailer’s demand 
𝑟 𝑟0 Interest rate of the bank 





𝜋𝑆 , 𝜋𝑅 
Customer’s perceived value on the retailer’s bargaining power 
Customer’s perceived value on the retailer’s marketing influence 
Linear effect of market power on the bank’s interest rate 
Rate of acceleration in costs for marketing influence  
The profit of the supplier and the retailer, respectively 
 𝐶𝐼  Cost of retailer’s initial investment in marketing influence 





Financing cost for the retailer (money borrow from the bank) 
Bank’s revenue 
Level of the retailer’s marketing influence   






Unit retail price  























Chapter 4 Model discussion 
In this chapter, I first model the problems of the retailer, the supplier, and the bank, 
respectively. Then I present the game sequence when the retailer has the different 
leadership status (𝑙 = {𝑆, 𝑅, 𝐵}).  
4.1 Model 
4.1.1 The retailer’s problem  
With demand function in (4), predetermined level of the marketing influence (𝛼), 
the bank’s interest rate (𝑟) in (3), the retailer will maximize its profit by setting optimal 
retail price (𝑝∗): 
 𝜋𝑅 = 𝑝𝐷(𝑝) −  𝐶𝐹 −  𝐶𝐼.             (5) 
Notice that  𝐶𝐹 = 𝑤𝐷(𝑝)(1 + 𝑟). On the right-hand side of (5), the first term is the 
retailer’s revenue from selling the product to the customers; the second term is the costs 
of loan borrowed from the bank to pay the purchasing cost to the supplier and to pay 
the interest to the bank; the last term is the retailer’s investment cost in marketing 
influence.  
4.1.2 The supplier’s problem  
With demand function in (4), the supplier will maximize its profit by setting the 
optimal wholesale price (𝑤∗): 
𝜋𝑠 = 𝑤𝐷(𝑝) .               (6) 
On the right-hand side of (6) is the revenue of the supplier from supplying products 
to the retailer. Since the unit production cost (c) is normalized to 0, the profit of the 
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supplier will equal to its revenue. 
4.1.3 The bank’s problem  
 As discussed above, the bank will evaluate the payoff ability of the retailer based 
on its market leadership status and its initial investment level. Therefore, after observing 
the retailer’s performance, leadership status (l) and marketing influence(𝛼), the bank 
will announce its interest rate (r) in (1) to the retailer, which is common information for 
both the retailer and the bank. Then the bank’s revenue is: 
 𝑅𝐹 = 𝑤𝐷(𝑝)𝑟.               (7) 
 According to (7), since the financing cost from the bank ( 𝐶𝐹) is what the retailer 
needs to borrow from the bank to purchase the products from the supplier, the bank’s 
revenue comes from the interest of the loan accordingly. 
The game sequence depends the retailer’s leadership status (𝑙). If the retailer is the 
Stackelberg leader in the supply chain (𝑙 = 𝑅), the retailer first chooses its margin profit 
(𝑚). As the follower, after observing the retailer’s margin profit (𝑚), the supplier 
announces the wholesale price (𝑤). When the supplier is the Stackelberg leader in the 
supply chain ( 𝑙 = 𝑆 ), the supplier announces the wholesale price first (𝑤 ). After 
knowing the supplier’s wholesale price, the retailer decides the retail price (𝑝). When 
the retailer plays the Nash game with the supplier, the supplier announces the wholesale 
price and the retailer announces retail price simultaneously. 
Next, the equilibrium solutions are derived from the retailer’s three different 
leadership status (𝑙 = {𝑆, 𝑅, 𝑁}). The problem for each game is solved backwardly. 
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4.2 Equilibrium solutions 
4.2.1 Supplier Stackelberg (𝒍 = 𝑺) 
4.2.1.1 General impact 
Given a wholesale price (𝑤𝑆) and with (5), the second-order condition of (5) w.r.t. 
𝑝 is negative, then there exists a unique optimal 𝑝𝑆(𝑤)∗  by setting the first-order 




.            (8) 
It is intuitive that 𝑝𝑆(𝑤)∗ increases with the wholesale price (𝑤) so that equation 
(8) also shows that the retailer compensates for the investment cost. In addition, for a 
given 𝑤, (8) shows that 𝑝𝑆(𝑤)∗ increases with the retailer’s initial investment level (𝛼) 
if the supplier’s wholesale price is sufficiently low ( 𝑤 < 𝑏 𝛿⁄ ); otherwise, 
𝑝𝑆(𝑤)∗ decreases with 𝛼. This suggests that if the retailer’s unit purchasing price (𝑤) 
is sufficiently low, as it invests more in marketing influence, it should raise the retail 
price to compensate for the investment cost. However, if the retailer’s unit purchasing 
price (𝑤) is sufficiently high (𝑤 > 𝑏 𝛿⁄ ), as it invests more in marketing influence, it 
should cut the retail price to attract more demand from customers. Furthermore, 
𝑝𝑆(𝑤)∗ decreases with 𝛿, implying that if the bank puts greater weight on the retailer’s 
initial investment in marketing influence, the retailer will set a lower price to expand 
demand; if customers’ perceived value on the retailer’s effort in promoting the 
marketing influence (𝑏) is higher, the retailer will set a higher price.  
With (8) and the supplier’s profit function in (6), the second-order condition of (8) 
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and (6) w.r.t. 𝑤 is negative. I have the following results: 
Proposition 1: There exists unique optimal prices (𝑝𝑆∗, 𝑤𝑆∗) for the retailer and 








.              (10) 
Proposition 1 shows the interesting results. The optimal retail price (𝑝𝑆∗) only 
relates to the retailer’s investment in promoting marketing influence. Specifically, that 
retailer sets a higher price if it invests more in the marketing influence (𝛼) in the early 
stage to compensate for the investment cost. Besides, if customers’ perceived value on 
the retailer’s effort in promoting the marketing influence (𝑏) is higher, the retailer will 
set a higher price because a good product/store image attracts more demand. 
 In addition, 𝑤𝑆∗ increases with customers’ perceived values on the retailer’s 
effort in promoting the marketing influence (𝑏). It implies that the higher customers’ 
perceived values, the more customers will buy the products. With more demand, the 
supplier can charge a high wholesale price as the retailer will order more. Furthermore, 
𝑤𝑆∗ increases with 𝛿, implying that if the bank puts greater weight on the retailer’s 
initial investment in the marketing influence, the retailer will have a lower financing 
cost and thus the supplier can set a higher wholesale price to increase its margin profit. 
Equation (9) also shows that 𝑤𝑆∗ decreases with 𝜃, suggesting that when the bank 
gives greater weight to the retailer’s leadership status, in a Supplier Stackelberg supply 
chain, the supplier should reduce the wholesale price because the retailer’s financing 
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cost from the bank is high.  
With Equations (4)–(7), the retailer’s demand, profits of the retailer and the supplier, 



























.               (15) 
As discussed above, the retail price (𝑝*) is related to both the retailer’s initial 
investment level (𝛼) and the effort that the retailer puts into promoting the marketing 
influence (𝑏). Equation (11) suggests that if the retailer invests more through promotion 
activities to maintain and improve its product/store image, customers tend to purchase 
more products. The optimal result shows a positive relationship between the customer’s 
demand (𝐷𝑆∗) and retailer’s initial investment level (𝛼) for more marketing influence. 
It is obvious that the supplier benefits from the retailer’s investment because it can 
charge a higher wholesale price and the retailer orders more product due to the increase 
in demand. However, the retailer’s profit can be increased only when this effect on the 
retail price and demand exceeds its cost of investment ( 𝑘𝛼2/2 ). Equation (12) 
demonstrates that when k is sufficiently low (𝑘 < 𝑏2/8), the retailer enhances its profit 
if it increases the initial investment level (𝛼). This represents that when the accelerating 
rate (k) in this investment cost is low, even if the retailer sets a higher investment level 
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in marketing influence, the total investment cost is still relatively low, which can be 
offset by the expansion in the demand and the increase in the retail price. As a result, 
the retailer benefits from this investment. When the accelerating rate (k) in this 
investment cost is sufficiently high (𝑘 > 𝑏2/8), however, the retailer’s profit will 
decrease due to high investment cost. This suggests that when the retailer is aware that 
k is sufficiently low (𝑘 < 𝑏2/8), investing in promoting store/product image may be a 
good option. Also, if customers perceive that the retailer’s effort in promoting the 
marketing influences (𝑏) more, more customers will buy products. Moreover, since 
retailer price (𝑝𝑆∗) increases with the customer’s perceived value on retailer’s effort in 
promoting its product (b), apparently, both the profits of the retailer and the supplier 
increase with b. Since the retailer’s financing cost increases with b, the bank’s revenue 
increases as well. On the other hand, the wholesale price (𝑤𝑆∗) will increase with the 
level that the bank weights the retailer’s initial investment in the marketing influence 
(𝛿), as well as decreases with the level that the bank weights the retailer’s leadership 
status (𝜃). The supplier’s profit (𝜋𝑠
𝑆∗) increases with 𝛿 and decreases with 𝜃. The 
bank’s revenue (𝑅𝐹
𝑆∗ ) decreases with 𝛿  and increases with 𝜃  because it gives the 
retailer a low interest rate if 𝛿 is high and a high interest rate if retailer is a follower in 
the supply chain.  
4.2.1.2 The impact of retailer’s initial investment level (𝜶) 
 In this section, the impact of retailer’s initial investment level on marketing 
influence (𝛼) on prices, demand, profits of the retailer and the manufacturer, and the 
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revenue of the bank is illustrated by a numerical example and shown in Fig. 2, for the 
Supplier Stackelberg game. Here, I set 𝑏 = 0.4, 𝑟0 = 0.12, 𝜃 = 0.15, 𝛿 = 0.2, and 
𝑘 = 0.66. 
 
Fig 2. (a) The impact of 𝛼 on 𝑝𝑆∗, 𝑤𝑆∗, and 𝐷𝑆∗ under the Supplier Stackelberg 
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𝑆∗ under the Supplier Stackelberg 
supply chain 
 As discussed above, the retailer sets a higher retailer price (𝑝𝑆∗) if it invests more 
in the marketing influence (𝛼) in the early stage, to compensate the investment cost as 
more customers will purchase products. Therefore, there is a positive relationship 
between the customer’s demand (𝐷𝑆∗) and the retailer’s initial investment level (𝛼) for 
more marketing influence. It is obvious that the supplier benefits the retailer’s 
investment as it can charge a high wholesale price (𝑤𝑆∗) and the retailer orders more 
product due to the increase in demand. It is straight forward that the supplier’s profit 
increases with 𝛼 in Fig. 2. However, in terms of retailer’s profit, Fig. 2 shows that it 
keeps increasing till it reaches the maximum value point (
𝛼𝑏2+𝑏−8𝛼𝑘
8
) then starting 
decreasing. After the point when 𝛼 = 0.66, the retailer’s profit becomes zero, the 
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between 𝛼 equals 0 and 0.66. When the wholesale price increases as retailer invests 
more, financing cost of the retailer will increase as well even the bank will offer a low 
interest rate. For the bank’s revenue, it first increases when 𝛿 < 𝑏[(𝜃 + 𝑟0 − 𝛿𝛼)
2 −
𝛿𝛼] − 1  while starts decreasing when  𝛿 > 𝑏[(𝜃 + 𝑟0 − 𝛿𝛼)
2 − 𝛿𝛼] − 1  which 
indicates when the bank weighs the retailer’s initial investment in the marketing 
influence (𝛿) is sufficiently low (𝛿 < 𝑏[(𝜃 + 𝑟0 − 𝛿𝛼)
2 − 𝛿𝛼] − 1), the bank’s revenue 
will increase due to high wholesale price and demand. This suggests that when (𝛿) is 
sufficiently high (𝛿 > 𝑏[(𝜃 + 𝑟0 − 𝛿𝛼)
2 − 𝛿𝛼] − 1), the bank offers a low interest may 
be a good option for the bank. 
4.2.2 Retailer Stackelberg (𝒍 = 𝑹) 
4.2.2.1 General impact 
Given a margin profit (𝑚𝑅 = 𝑝𝑅 − 𝑤𝑅), with (6), the second-order condition of (6) 
w.r.t. 𝑤 is negative, then there is a unique optimal 𝑤𝑅(𝑚)∗ by setting the first-order 




.             (16) 
It is intuitive that 𝑤𝑅(𝑚)∗ decreases with the margin profit (𝑚𝑅). As the retailer 
reserves more profit margin, the supplier has to reduce the wholesale price. In addition, 
(16) shows that the wholesale price, 𝑤𝑅(𝑚)∗ , increases with the retailer’s initial 
investment level (𝛼). This suggests that because the retailer invests more in marketing 
influence, the supplier’s margin profit increases as it can charge a higher wholesale price. 
Furthermore, 𝑤𝑅(𝑚)∗ increases if customers’ perceived value on the retailer’s effort in 
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promoting the marketing influence (𝑏) is high. 
With (16) and the retailer’s profit function in (5), the second-order condition of (5) 
w.r.t. 𝑚 is negative, then there exists a unique optimal profit margin (𝑚𝑅∗), which is 
given by setting the first-order condition to be 0. I obtain the following results: 
Proposition 2: There exists unique optimal margin profit and wholesale price 








.              (18) 
Proposition 2 illustrates some interesting findings. The optimal profit margin 
𝑚𝑅∗ increases with customers’ perceived values on the retailer’s effort in promoting the 
marketing influence (𝑏). It implies that the higher customers’ perceived values, the more 
customers will buy the products. With more demand, the retailer can earn a higher profit 
margin to compensate for the investment cost. One might expect that the retailer’s 
margin increases with the level that the bank weights the retailer’s initial investment in 
the marketing influence (𝛿). However, (17) also shows that the retailer’s profit margin 
decreases with the level that the bank weights the retailer’s initial investment in the 
marketing influence (𝛿), as well as decreases with the level that the bank weights the 
retailer’s leadership status (𝜃). This means that when the bank gives more weight to 
both the retailer’s initial investment in the marketing influence and the retailer’s leader 
status, the retailer’s financing cost will be low under the Retailer Stackelberg supply 
chain, and its profit margin will be low, which is counterintuitive. 
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Moreover, 𝑤𝑅∗ increases with customers’ perceived value of the retailer’s effort in 
promoting the marketing influence (𝑏). It implies that the higher customers’ perceived 
value, the more customers will buy the products. A higher demand allows the supplier 
to charge a higher wholesale price as the retailer will order more. Furthermore, 
𝑤𝑅∗ increases with 𝛿, implying that if the bank weights the retailer’s initial investment 
in the marketing influence more, the retailer will have a lower financing cost and thus 
the supplier can set a higher wholesale price to increase its profit. Equation (18) also 
shows that 𝑤𝑅∗ increases with 𝜃, suggesting that when the bank weights the retailer’s 
leadership status more, in a Retailer Stackelberg supply chain, the supplier, as a follower, 
should increase the wholesale price because the retailer’s financing cost from the bank 
is low. Moreover, the supplier’s wholesale price has a positive association with the 
retailer’s initial investment level (𝛼), suggesting that the supplier benefits from the 
retailer’s investment because it can charge a higher wholesale price because of higher 
demand from customers. 




.            (19) 
Interestingly, the optimal retail price relates to the retailer’s effort in promoting 
marketing influence. If customers’ perceived value of the retailer’s effort in promoting 
the marketing influence (𝑏) is higher, customers tend to require more products, the 
retailer will set a higher retail price because a good product/store image helps to increase 
its margin profit. Besides, the retail price decreases with the level that the bank weights 
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the retailer’s initial investment in the marketing influence (𝛿), as well as decreases with 
the level that the bank weights the retailer’s leadership status (𝜃). In other words, when 
the bank offers a low interest rate, the retailer’s financing cost is low, hence the retailer 
can set a low retail price to attract more demand. 
With (4)–(7), the retailer’s demand, profits of the retailer and the supplier, the 



























.            (24) 
As discussed above, the retail price (𝑝𝑅∗) is related to the effort that the retailer puts 
into promoting the marketing influence. Equation (20) suggests that if the retailer puts 
more effort into promotion activities to maintain and improve its product/store image, 
more customers will purchase the products. The optimal result shows a positive relation 
between the customer’s demand (𝐷𝑅∗) and the retailer’s initial investment level (𝛼) for 
more marketing influence. It is obvious that the supplier benefits from the retailer’s 
investment because it can charge a high wholesale price and the retailer orders more 
product due to increase in demand. Moreover, since retail price (𝑝𝑅∗) increases with 
customer’s perceived value on the retailer’s effort in promoting its product (b), 
apparently, the profits of both retailer and supplier increase with b. Since the retailer’s 
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financing cost increases with b, the bank’s revenue increases as well. As the wholesale 
price ( 𝑤𝑅∗ )) increases with the level that the bank weights the retailer’s initial 
investment in the marketing influence (𝛿), as well as increases with level that the bank 
weights the retailer’s leadership status (𝜃), the supplier’s profit (𝜋𝑠
𝑅∗) increases with 
both 𝛿 and 𝜃. The bank’s revenue (𝑅𝐹
𝑅∗) decreases with both 𝛿 and 𝜃 as it gives the 
retailer a low interest rate if either 𝛿 is high or if the retailer is a leader in the supply 
chain.  
4.2.2.2 The impact of retailer’s initial investment level (𝜶) 
In this section, I use a numerical example to illustrate the impact of retailer’s initial 
investment level on prices, demand, profits of the retailer and the supplier and the 
revenue of the bank in Fig. 3, for the Retailer Stackelberg supply chain. For comparison 
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Fig 3. (a) The impact of 𝛼 on 𝑝𝑅∗, 𝑤𝑅∗, 𝑚𝑅∗, and 𝐷𝑅∗ under the Retailer 
Stackelberg supply chain 
 




𝑅∗ under the Retailer Stackelberg 
supply chain 
 
As discussed above, the wholesale price, 𝑤𝑅
∗
, increases with the retailer’s initial 
investment level (𝛼 ). This suggests that as the retailer invests more in marketing 
influence, the supplier’s wholesale price increases due to higher demand (𝐷𝑅
∗
). That is, 
both the wholesale price and customer demand increase with 𝛼. Therefore, supplier 
benefits from the retailer’s investment in profit. As showed in Fig. 3, the retailer’s 
financing cost increases with the higher wholesale price and demand. However, for the 
bank’s revenue, it increases first when 
2(2+𝑟0−𝜃−𝛿𝛼)
𝛿(1+𝑏𝛼)
< 1  and decreases when 
2(2+𝑟0−𝜃−𝛿𝛼)
𝛿(1+𝑏𝛼)
> 1. After the point when 𝛼 = 0.48, bank’s revenue decreases to zero and 
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the range from 0 to 0.48. From Fig. 3, it is obvious that both the retail price and its 
margin profit increases as the retailer invests more. This represents that the retailer can 
set a high retailer price to enhance its margin profit as more customers tend to purchase 
products from the retailer. However, in terms of the retailer’s profit, the Fig. 3 shows 
that it increases with 𝛼 first till reaches a maximum point and starts decreasing. This 
represents that with an increasing 𝛼, the retailer’s profit increases due to higher demand 
from the customers. As 𝛼 continue increases, however, the revenue from increasing 
sales cannot offset the increasing financing cost and investment cost, therefore the 
retailer’s profit starts decreasing. 
4.2.3 Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium (𝒍 = 𝑩) 
4.2.3.1 General impact 
With the margin profit (𝑚𝐵 = 𝑝𝐵 − 𝑤𝐵), and (4)-(7), It can be proved that there 
exists a unique wholesale price (𝑤𝐵∗) and margin profit (𝑚𝐵∗) of the retailer. I find 
the following results: 
Proposition 3: There exists unique optimal margin profit and wholesale price 




 and 𝑚𝐵∗ =
(1+𝑏𝛼)(1+𝑟0−𝛿𝛼)
3+𝑟0−𝛿𝛼
.         (25) 
It is intuitive that both 𝑤𝐵∗ and 𝑚𝐵∗ increase with the customer’s perceived value 
on retailer’s effort in promoting its product (b). Since more customers purchase the 
products due to higher perceived value on retailer’s effort (b), the retailer can gain a 
higher profit margin, which allows the supplier to charge a higher wholesale price. 
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Furthermore, 𝑤𝐵∗ increases with the level that the bank weights the retailer’s initial 
investment in the marketing influence (𝛿) while 𝑚𝐵∗ decreases with 𝛿, implying that 
if the bank weights the retailer’s initial investment in marketing influence more, the 
retailer will have a lower financing cost and thus the supplier can set a higher wholesale 
price to enhance its revenue; therefore the margin profit (𝑚𝐵∗ ) of the retailer will 
decrease. Equation (25) shows that supplier’s wholesale price increases with the 
retailer’s initial investment level (𝛼) as customers’ demand is high due to retailer’s 
promotion activities; therefore, the supplier can set a high wholesale price to increase 
profit margin. Also, retailer’s profit margin will increase with 𝛼 due to more demand 
from the customers. 




.             (26) 
As shown in (25), 𝑚𝐵∗ increases with 𝑏, implying that if the customers’ perceived 
value on retailer’s effort (b) is higher, the retailer can gain a higher margin profit. 
Therefore, the retail price (𝑝𝐵∗) will increase. However, since 𝑚𝐵∗ decreases with the 
level that bank weighs the retailer’s initial investment in the marketing influence (𝛿), 
retail price decreases with 𝛿. That is, when bank offers a low interest rate and the 
retailer’s financing cost is low, the retailer can set a low retail price to attract more 
demand. 
With (4)–(7), the retailer’s demand, profits of the retailer and the supplier, the 
bank’s revenue, and the retailer’s financing cost are: 
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  𝐷𝐵∗ =
1+𝑏𝛼
3+𝑟0−𝛿𝛼























.             (31) 
As discussed above, the retail price (𝑝𝐵∗) is related to the effort that the retailer 
spends in promoting the marketing influence (𝑏). Equation (27) suggests that if the 
retailer invests more through promotion activities to maintain and improve its 
product/store image, more customers will purchase the products. Moreover, since 
retailer price (𝑝𝐵∗) increases with customer’s perceived value on retailer’s effort in 
promoting its product (b), apparently, both the profits of the retailer and the supplier 
increase with b. Since the retailer’s financing cost increases with b, the bank’s revenue 
increases. The optimal result also shows a positive relation between the customer’s 
demand ( 𝐷𝐵∗ ) and the retailer’s initial investment level ( 𝛼 ) for more marketing 
influence, which indicates that as the retailer invests more, more customers tend to buy. 
Equation (27) also shows that customers demand increases with the level that the bank 
weights the retailer’s initial investment in the marketing influence (𝛿) as the retailer will 
set a low retail price due to low interest rate to attract more customers’ demand. It is 
obvious that the supplier benefits from the retailer’s investment because it can charge a 
higher wholesale price and the retailer orders more product due to the increase in 
demand. Since wholesale price (𝑤𝐵∗) will increase with the level that the bank weights 
40 
 
the retailer’s initial investment in the marketing influence (𝛿), the supplier’s profit (𝜋𝑠
𝐵∗) 
increases with 𝛿 as well. The bank’s revenue (𝑅𝐹
𝐵∗) decreases with 𝛿 because it gives 
the retailer a low interest rate if 𝛿 is high. 
4.2.3.2 The impact of retailer’s initial investment level (𝜶) 
In this subsection, numerical examples are used to illustrate the impact of retailer’s 
initial investment level on prices, demand, and profits of the retailer and the 
manufacturer, and the revenue of the bank in Fig. 4, when the supplier and the retailer 
play Bertrand Nash game. To comparison purpose, the same parameters are set as in 
4.2.1.2.  
 
Fig 4. (a) The impact of 𝛼 on 𝑝𝐵∗, 𝑤𝐵∗, 𝑚𝐵∗, and 𝐷𝐵∗ under the Bertrand-Nash 
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𝐵∗ under the Bertrand-Nash Game 
supply chain 
As discussed above, both the wholesale price (𝑤𝐵∗) and the demand (𝐷𝐵∗) have a 
positive association with the level of the retailer’s initial investment. Therefore, both 
the supplier’s profit and the financing cost increases with 𝛼  due to the higher 
wholesale price and customers demand. However, it is clear that the bank’s revenue 
(𝑅𝐹
𝐵∗) decreases as the retailer invests more. This represents that the effect of 𝛼 on both 
the wholesale price and the demand cannot offset that effect on the interest rate from 
the bank, since the interest rate is relatively low under the Bertrand-Nash game supply 
chain. After the point when 𝛼 = 0.72, bank’s revenue becomes zero. In other words, 
bank stops lending money to the retailer. Hence, Fig. 4 only includes the results between 
𝛼 = 0 and 𝛼 = 0.72. Moreover, Fig. 4 shows that the retail price (𝑝𝐵∗) increases as 
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increase in customers demand. In terms of the retailer’s margin profit (𝑚𝐵∗), it increases 
with 𝛼. This represents the impact of level of retailer’s initial investment level on the 
retail price is greater than that of on the wholesale price. Besides, Fig. 4 also indicates 
the retailer’s profit (𝜋𝑅
𝐵∗) increases first, after that the retailer’s profit decreases. This 
represents that with an increasing 𝛼, the retailer’s profit increases due to higher demand 
from the customers. However, as 𝛼  further increases, the increasing sales revenue 
cannot offset the increasing financing cost and investment cost, therefore the retailer’s 
profit starts decreasing. 
4.3 Comparison for three retailer’s leadership 
In this subsection, I conduct numerical studies to illustrate how the retailer’s 
leadership status affects its loan from the bank.  
4.3.1 The impact of retailer’s initial investment level (𝜶) 
 In this subsection, I use numerical examples to illustrate the impact of the retailer’s 
initial investment level on the retailer’s profit (illustrated in Fig. 5), the supplier’s profit 
(illustrated in Fig. 6), the revenue of the bank (illustrated in Fig. 7), and the financing 
cost (illustrated in Fig. 8). For easy comparison and illustration, parameters are set 𝑏 =




Fig 5. The impact of 𝛼 on 𝜋𝑅 under three supply chain structures 
Interestingly, the retailer’s profits under various supply chain structures have a 
similar pattern. The results are summarized as follows. 
Observation 1: 
1) The retailer’s profit increases first and then decreases with 𝛼 no matter who is the 
leader in the supply chain; 
2) When the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, it always benefits from being the 
first mover and gains the least profit from being the second mover;  
3) The retailer’s profit reaches the highest point when 𝛼 is 0.32, 0.28, and 0.14 under 
games of the Retailer Stackelberg, the Nash Equilibrium, and under the Supplier 
Stackelberg, respectively. Let 𝛼𝑆 , 𝛼𝐵 , and 𝛼𝑅  be these values. This numerical 
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4) When the supplier is the leader, the retailer will not invest on the marketing influence 
when 𝛼 is 0.66. 
Based on the discussion, Observation 1 can be explained as: 1) the impact of 
marketing influence on the retailer’s revenue is greater than the impact on both 
investment cost and financing cost when the retailer begins investing in its marketing 
influence. However, as the retailer invests more, the impact of 𝛼  on the retailer’s 
revenue is less than the impact on its costs. Hence the retailer’s profit increases first and 
then decreases. This implies that it is not always the case that the more investment in 
promoting the marketing influence, the more benefit the retailer can gain. The retailer 
should balance the benefit from marketing expansion due to the promotion versus the 
cost; 2) when the retailer has more supply chain power, it receives a lower interest rate 
from the bank, therefore the retailer’s profit can be enhanced; 3) when the retailer is the 
price leader in the supply chain, in addition to gaining higher profit, it has the highest 
profit when the retailer invests more on marketing influence; when the retailer is the 
price follower, however, it earns the highest profit when the retailer invests less on the 
marketing influence. This finding suggests the retailer should invest more to achieve 
the highest profit when it has more supply chain power, and invest less when it is the 
second mover in the supply chain; 4) the retailer will stop investing in marketing 
influence because it will not be profitable due to high investment cost. 
The impact of retailer’s initial investment level (𝛼) on the supplier’s profit (𝜋𝑆) is 




Fig 6. The impact of 𝛼 on 𝜋𝑆 under three supply chain structures 
It is obviously that the supplier benefits more when the retailer invests more in 
improving its marketing influence. The interesting results are summarized in the 
following observation.  
Observation 2:  
1) Under three conditions, the supplier’s profit keeps increasing with 𝛼;  
2) When the supplier is the leader in the supply chain, as the retailer invests more on 
marketing influence, the supplier gains the highest profit, followed by in the Nash 
Equilibrium game and the Retailer Stackelberg game. 
These interesting results from Observation 2 can be explained as: 1) since both 
demand D and wholesale price w increase as the retailer invests more, the profit will 






















THE INITIAL INVESTMENT LEVEL ON MARKET INFLUENCE
Supplier's profit (S) Supplier's profit (R) Supplier's profit (B)
46 
 
a lot from being a first mover as it can set a higher wholesale price due to higher demand 
from both the retailer and customers. 
The impact of the retailer’s initial investment level (𝛼) on bank’s revenue (𝑅𝐹) is 
illustrated by Fig. 7. 
 
Fig 7. The impact of 𝛼 on 𝑅𝐹 under three supply chain structures 
For the bank’s revenue under three different games, the interesting results are 
summarized in the following Observation 3. 
Observation 3: 
1) Bank’s revenue under the Supplier Stackelberg increases first till reaches the 
maximum point ( 𝛼  is 0.28) and then decreases while bank’s revenue keeps 
decreasing under the Retailer Stackelberg and the Nash Equilibrium; 
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𝛼 is 0.48 while bank stops lending money to the retailer when 𝛼 is 0.72 under the 
Nash Equilibrium; 
3) Bank will earn the highest revenue when the retailer is the follower in the supply 
chain while it can have the lowest revenue when the retailer is the first mover. 
These interesting results can be explained as: 1) when the retailer is the price 
follower and 𝛼 is relatively low, bank observes the retailer’s leadership status and 
initial marketing influence level, then offers a high interest rate; as the retailer invests 
more, bank offers a lower interest rate. Therefore, the bank’s revenue increases first then 
decreases under the Supplier Stackelberg. On the other hand, when the retailer is the 
price leader and 𝛼 is low, bank will offer a much lower interest rate due to the retailer’s 
leadership status. Thus, the bank’s revenue keeps decreasing under the Retailer 
Stackelberg. As the retailer invests more, bank will not lend money to the retailer as it 
is not profitable; 2) when the retailer is the leader, after bank observes its leadership 
status, bank offers an interest rate that is lower than the condition when it’s the Supplier 
Stackelberg or the Nash Equilibrium. Therefore, bank will earn less revenue under the 
Retailer Stackelberg and eventually stop lending money to the retailer. 3) Bank prefers 
the retailer can be the follower in the supply chain because bank offers a high interest 
rate and receives high revenue. 
The impact of the retailer’s initial investment level (𝛼) on its financing cost (𝐶𝐹) is 




Fig 8. The impact of 𝛼 on 𝐶𝐹 under three supply chain structures 
 For the retailer’s financing cost, the interesting results are summarized as follows. 
Observation 4:  
1) Financing cost increases with 𝛼 under three games;  
2) The retailer incurs the highest financing cost under the Supplier Stackelberg games 
while experiencing the lowest financing cost when the retailer is the leader in the 
supply chain.  
Based on the discussion, I can explain the Observation 4 as: 1) when the retailer 
invests more on marketing influence, the financing cost is higher because the impact of 
𝛼 on both wholesale price and demand is greater than the impact of 𝛼 on the bank’s 
interest rate. Even if the bank offers a lower interest rate, with an increasing 𝛼, the 
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the bank observes the leadership status of the retailer and offers a lower interest rate. 
Hence, the financing cost will be lower under the Retailer Stackelberg supply chain.  
4.3.2 Hypotheses 
 This thesis focus on the impact of different factors on both the retailer’s profit and 
financing cost. Hence, in this section, I develop my theoretical hypotheses based on the 
figures and observations above. 
4.3.2.1 Retailer’s profit 
Hypotheses 1: 
1) All else equal, when 𝛼 increases, the retailer’s profit is non-linear with respect to 
retailer’s initial investment level on marketing influence; 
2) When the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, the retailer’s profit is higher as 
compared to the retailer’s profit if it is a follower. 
4.3.2.2 Financing cost 
Hypotheses 2: 
1) The retailer has the lowest financing cost if it is the leader in the supply chain; 
2) However, financing cost increases linearly with an increasing 𝛼. 
4.3.3 The impact of the importance of the retailer’s marketing influence (𝒃) 
 The impact of the importance of the retailer’s marketing influence ( 𝑏 ) that 
customers can observe is illustrated by numerical examples. The impact on the retailer’s 
profit (illustrated in Fig. 9), the supplier’s profit (illustrated in Fig. 10), the revenue of 
the bank (illustrated in Fig. 11), and the retailer’s financing cost (illustrated in Fig. 12) 
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are also summarized. For easy comparison and illustration, I set 𝛼 = 0.30, 𝑟0 = 0.15, 
𝜃 = 0.05, 𝛿 = 0.20, and 𝑘 = 0.50. 
 
Fig 9. The impact of 𝑏 on 𝜋𝑅 under three supply chain structures 
Interestingly, the retailer’s profits under supply chain structures perform similarly. 
The results can be summarized in Observation 5. 
Observation 5:  
1) The retailer’s profit increases with 𝑏 under three games; 
2) When the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, it always benefits from being the 
first mover and gains the least profit when it is the second mover. 
Observation 5 indicates that: 1) the retailer will gain more profit as consumers 
perceive that it puts more effort into promoting its marketing influence because 
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when the retailer has more power in the supply chain, the bank will offer a lower interest 
rate. Therefore, the profit will be higher under the Retailer Stackelberg supply chain. 
The impact of the importance of the retailer’s initial investment level (𝑏) on the 
supplier’s profit (𝜋𝑆) is illustrated by Fig. 10. 
 
Fig 10. The impact of 𝑏 on 𝜋𝑆 under three supply chain structures 
 It is obviously that the supplier benefits more when the retailer puts more effort on 
its marketing influence. The interesting results are summarized in the following 
Observation 6.  
Observation 6: 
1) Under all three games, the supplier’s profit increases with 𝑏;  
2) When the supplier is the leader in the supply chain, it always benefits from being 
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Based on the discussion, Observation 6 can be explained as: 1) since both demand 
D and wholesale price w increase as the retailer puts more effort on promoting its 
marketing influence, the supplier’s profit increases no matter who is the leader in the 
supply chain; 2) when the supplier has more supply chain power, it has the right to set 
a higher wholesale price because of higher demand. Hence, the supplier’s profit is 
higher under the Supplier Stackelberg supply chain. 
The impact of the importance of the retailer’s initial investment level (𝑏) on the 
bank’s revenue (𝑅𝐹) is illustrated by Fig. 11. 
 
Fig 11. The impact of 𝑏 on 𝑅𝐹 under three supply chain structures 
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1) Under three conditions, the bank’s revenue increases with 𝑏; 
2) When the retailer is the follower in the supply chain, the bank’s revenue can gain 
the highest revenue while gaining the least revenue when the retailer is the leader.  
These interesting results can be explained as: 1) both demand D and wholesale price 
w increase as the customers perceive that retailer puts more effort on promoting its 
marketing influence. Hence, bank’s revenue increases with b as well; 2) when the 
retailer has low supply chain power, bank will offer a high interest rate. However, when 
bank observes the retailer has more supply chain power, it offers a lower interest. 
Therefore, bank prefers the retailer can be the follower in the supply chain because bank 
can receive a high revenue by offering a high interest rate. 
The impact of the importance of the retailer’s initial investment level (𝑏) on the 




Fig 12. The impact of 𝑏 on 𝐶𝐹 under three supply chain structures 
 For the retailer’s financing cost, the interesting results are summarized in the 
following Observation 8. 
Observation 8: 
1) Financing cost increases with 𝑏 under three conditions; 
2) The retailer experiences the highest financing cost under the Supplier Stackelberg 
games while experiencing the lowest financing cost when it is the price leader in the 
supply chain.  
Observation 8 can be explained as: 1) both wholesale price and demand increase 
with b, thus, the financing cost of the retailer increases when customers observe that the 
retailer puts more effort on promoting its marketing influence; 2) when the retailer is 
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In this way, the retailer’s financing cost is lower under the Retailer Stackelberg supply 
chain.   
4.3.4 Hypotheses 
This thesis investigates the impact of different factors on both the retailer’s profit 
and financing cost. Hence, in this section, I develop theoretical hypotheses based on the 
discussions and observations above. 
4.3.4.1 Retailer’s profit 
Hypothesis 3: 
1) All else equal, when 𝑏  increases, the retailer’s profit is positively linear with 
respect to retailer’s effort on promoting marketing influence; 
2) When the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, the retailer’s profit is always 
higher as compared to the retailer’s profit if it is a follower. 
4.3.4.2 Financing cost 
Hypothesis 4: 
1) The retailer has the lowest financing cost if it is the leader in the supply chain; 
2) Financing cost increases linearly with an increasing 𝑏. 
4.3.5 The impact of the level that the bank weighs the retailer’s initial investment 
in the marketing influence (𝜹) 
 In this section, I use a numerical example to illustrate the impact of the level that 
the bank weighs the retailer’s initial investment in the marketing influence on the 
retailer’s profit (illustrated in Fig. 13), supplier’s profit (illustrated in Fig. 14), the 
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revenue of the bank (illustrated in Fig. 15), and the financing cost (illustrated in Fig. 
16). For easy comparison and illustration, I set 𝛼 = 0.30, 𝑟0 = 0.15, 𝑏 = 0.50, 𝜃 =
0.05, and 𝑘 = 0.50. 
 
Fig 13. The impact of 𝛿 on 𝜋𝑅 under three supply chain structures 
Interestingly, the retailer’s profits under supply chain structures do not have the 
similar performance. The results are summarized in Observation 9 as follows. 
 Observation 9: 
1) The retailer’s profits increase with 𝛿 under the Retailer Stackelberg and the Nash 
Equilibrium while the retailer’s profit does not change with 𝛿 when supplier is the 
price leader in the supply chain; 
2) When the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, it always benefits from the first 
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Based on the discussion, Observation 9 can be explained as: 1) when the retailer is 
the Stackelberg leader, bank perceives its leadership status and offers a lower interest 
rate. Hence, the retailer’s profit is increasing. Under the Supplier Stackelberg, the 
impact of the increasing wholesale price with 𝛿 offsets the impact of the decreasing 
interest rate with 𝛿. Therefore, the retailer’s profit does not change. This represents that 
even if the bank observes the retailer’s initial investment on the marketing influence, if 
the retailer is the second mover in the supply chain, the profit will not change; 2) when 
the retailer has more power in the supply chain, bank offers a lower interest rate. Thus, 
the profit will be higher under the Retailer Stackelberg supply chain. 
The impact of the level that bank weighs the retailer’s initial investment level (𝛿) 
on the supplier’s profit (𝜋𝑆) is illustrated by Fig. 14. 
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 It is obviously that supplier benefits a lot when bank weighs the level of the 
retailer’s initial investment in the marketing influence more. The interesting results can 
be summarized in Observation 10 as follows. 
 Observation 10: 
1) Under three games, the supplier’s profit keeps increasing with 𝛿;  
2) When the supplier is the leader in the supply chain, it always benefits from the first 
mover to earn the highest profit and gains the least profit from the second mover.  
Observation 10 can be explained as: 1) since both demand D and wholesale price w 
increase as bank weighs more on the level of the retailer’s initial investment in the 
marketing influence, the supplier’s profit increases as well; 2) when the supplier is the 
supply chain leader, it always earns more profit through setting a high wholesale price 
due to higher demand. 
The impact of the level that bank weighs the retailer’s initial investment level (𝛿) 




Fig 15. The impact of 𝛿 on 𝑅𝐹 under three supply chain structures 
In terms of bank’s revenue, it shows similar performance under three different 
supply chain games, and the results can be summarized as follows. 
Observation 11: 
1) Bank’s revenue keeps decreasing under three conditions;  
2) Bank’s revenue has the highest value when the retailer is the second mover while 
has the lowest value when the retailer is the first mover in the supply chain; 
3) Bank will not offer loan to the retailer when 𝛿 = 0.66  under the Supplier 
Stackelberg, followed by 𝛿 = 0.50  under the Nash Equilibrium and 𝛿 = 0.32 
under the Retailer Stackelberg.  
Based on Observation 11, the interesting results can be explained as: 1) as the bank 





















THE LEVEL THAT THE BANK WEIGHS THE RETAILER’S 
INITIAL INVESTMENT IN THE MARKET INFLUENCE
Bank's revenue (S) Bank's revenue (R) Bank's revenue (B)
60 
 
lower interest rate, therefore the bank’s revenue decreases no matter who is the 
Stackelberg leader; 2) this indicates that the bank prefers the retailer be the follower in 
the supply chain as it can receive a high revenue through offering a high interest rate; 
3) the bank will not offer loan to the retailer when it is not profitable to do that. 
The impact of the level that bank weighs the retailer’s initial investment level (𝛿) 
on the financing cost (𝐶𝐹) is illustrated by Fig. 16. 
 
Fig 16. The impact of 𝛿 on 𝐶𝐹 under three supply chain structures 
 For the retailer’s financing cost, the interesting results can be concluded in the 
following Observation 12: 
 Observation 12: 
1) The retailer’s financing cost increases with 𝛿 first till reaches its highest point (𝛿 
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decreases with 𝛿 under the Nash Equilibrium. When the supplier is the leader, 
financing cost does not change with the level that bank weighs the retailer’s 
investment in the marketing influence; 
2) The retailer’s financing cost is the highest under the Supplier Stackelberg while it is 
the lowest when the retailer is the price leader in the supply chain.  
Observation 12 can be explained as: 1) even if the bank observes the retailer’s 
investment level in the marketing influence, as a second mover, the retailer receives a 
relatively lower interest rate from the bank. With an increasing 𝛿, the impact on a lower 
interest rate can offset the impact on a higher wholesale price and demand. Hence, the 
financing cost will not change under the Supplier Stackelberg. Also, under the Retailer 
Stackelberg, the bank observes the retailer’s initial investment level and retailer’s 
leadership status, it offers a low interest rate to the retailer. Besides, the impact of 𝛿 on 
both the wholesale price and the demand is larger than the impact of 𝛿  on bank’s 
interest rate first, which makes the financing cost increases with 𝛿. After the point when 
𝛿 = 0.34, the impact on the wholesale price and the demand is less than the impact of 
𝛿 on the bank’s interest rate, the retailer’s financing cost decreases. When the supplier 
is in the Nash game with the retailer, the bank will offer a relatively low interest rate. 
Hence, the impact of 𝛿 on the wholesale price and the demand is less than the impact 
on the interest rate, which causes the retailer’s financing cost decreases; 2) when the 
retailer has more power in the supply chain, its financing cost will be lower due to a 




This research focus on the impact of different factors on both the retailer’s profit 
and financing cost. Hence, in this section, I develop my theoretical hypotheses based on 
discussions and observations above. 
4.3.6.1 Retailer’s profit 
Hypothesis 5: 
1) All else equal, the retailer’s profit is positively linear with respect to the level that 
bank weighs the retailer’s initial investment level on marketing influence under the 
Retailer Stackelberg and the Nash Equilibrium. However, the level that bank weighs 
the retailer’s initial investment level on marketing influence does not affect the 
retailer’s profit under the Supplier Stackelberg; 
2) The retailer’s profit is always higher when the retailer is the leader in the supply 
chain as compared to the retailer’s profit if it is a follower. 
4.3.6.2 Financing cost 
Hypothesis 6: 
1) The retailer’s financing cost decreases linearly with 𝛿 under the Nash Equilibrium. 
However, its financing cost is non-linear with respect to the level that bank weighs 
the retailer’s initial investment level on marketing influence under the Retailer 
Stackelberg. Under the Supplier Stackelberg, the increasing 𝛿 does not affect the 
financing cost; 




4.3.7 The impact of the level that bank weighs on the retailer’s leadership (𝜽) 
 In this section, I use a numerical example to illustrate the impact of the level that 
bank weighs on the retailer’s leadership on the retailer’s profit (illustrated in Fig. 17), 
the supplier’s profit (illustrated in Fig. 18), the revenue of the bank (illustrated in Fig. 
19), and the financing cost (illustrated in Fig. 20). For easy comparison and illustration, 
I set 𝛼 = 0.30, 𝑟0 = 0.15, 𝑏 = 0.50, 𝛿 = 0.20, and 𝑘 = 0.50. 
 
Fig 17. The impact of 𝜃 on 𝜋𝑅 under three supply chain structures 
Interestingly, the retailer’s profits vary with different supply chain structures. The 
results can be summarized in Observation 13 as follows. 
Observation 13: 






















THE LEVEL THAT BANK WEIGHS ON THE RETAILER’S 
LEADERSHIP
Retailer's profit (S) Retailer's profit (R) Retailer's profit (B)
64 
 
leadership status when the retailer is the leader. However, when the retailer is the 
follower or has the equal power with the supplier in the supply chain, the retailer’s 
profit is unchanged with the level that bank weighs on the retailer’s leadership status; 
2) When the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, it always benefits from the first 
mover and gains the least profit from the second mover. 
Based on the discussion, Observation 13 can be explained as: 1) the level that bank 
weighs on the retailer’s leadership does not affect retailer’s profit under the Supplier 
Stackelberg and the Nash Equilibrium. When the retailer is the Stackelberg leader, bank 
offers a lower interest rate. Therefore, the retailer’s profit increases when bank perceives 
the leadership status of retailer more. 2) when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader in 
the supply chain, it can gain more profit for a lower interest rate. 
The impact of the level that bank weighs the retailer’s leadership status (𝜃) on the 




Fig 18. The impact of 𝜃 on 𝜋𝑆 under three supply chain structures 
 When it comes to the supplier’s profit, the interesting results can be summarized in 
the following Observation 14. 
 Observation 14:  
1) Under the Supplier Stackelberg, the supplier’s profit keeps decreasing with 𝜃 , 
while keeps increasing under the Retailer Stackelberg. Moreover, the supplier’s 
profit keeps unchanged with 𝜃 when it has the equal power with the retailer in the 
supply chain; 
2) Initially, the supplier’s profit under the Supplier Stackelberg is higher than that of 
under the Retailer Stackeleberg. However, as the bank perceives the retailer’s high 
leadership status (when 𝜃 is sufficiently high, 𝜃 >0.38 in the numerical example), 
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under the Supplier Stackelberg. 
Observation 14 can be explained as: 1) since both the wholesale price (w) and the 
demand (D) increase with level of the bank weighs the retailer’s leadership status under 
the Retailer Stackelberg, the supplier can earn more profit. Besides, since the wholesale 
price (w) decreases with level of bank weighs the retailer’s leader status under the 
Supplier Stackelberg, the supplier’s profit decreases as well; 2) under the Retailer 
Stackelberg supply chain, when the bank observes the a high level of retailer’s 
leadership status, it will offer a lower interest rate to the retailer. Therefore, the retailer 
can set a lower retail price in order to attract the customers. As the demand is higher, 
the retailer will order more from the supplier. In this way the supplier can earn more 
profit, as compared to the game when the supplier is the Stackelberg leader in the supply 
chain. 
The impact of the level that bank weighs the retailer’s leadership status (𝜃) on the 




Fig 19. The impact of 𝜃 on 𝑅𝐹 under three supply chain structures 
In terms of the bank’s revenue, it differs a lot under three different conditions, and 
the results can be summarized in Observation 15 as follows. 
Observation 15: 
1) Under the Supplier Stackelberg, the bank’s revenue keeps increasing with 𝜃 while 
keeps decreasing as the bank observes a high level of retailer’s leadership status 
under the Retailer Stackelberg. Moreover, the bank’s revenue does not change with 
𝜃 in the Nash Equilibrium; 
2) The bank’s revenue is the highest when the retailer is the second mover while is the 
lowest when the retailer is the first mover in the supply chain; 
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Based on Observation 15, the interesting results can be explained as: 1) when 
retailer is the second mover in the supply chain, the bank observes its leadership status 
and offers a high interest rate. Hence the bank’s revenue increases with 𝜃. When the 
retailer becomes the first mover, bank offers a lower interest rate instead. Therefore, 
even both the wholesale price and the demand increase with 𝜃  under the Retailer 
Stackelberg supply chain, with a low interest rate, the bank’s revenue decreases with 𝜃; 
2) this indicates that the bank prefers the retailer be the follower in the supply chain 
because it can receive a high revenue by offering high interest rate; 3) when retailer is 
the Stackelberg leader and 𝜃 sufficiently high (𝜃 > 0.08 in this numerical study), the 
bank is unwilling to offer loan to the retailer as it is not profitable. 
The impact of the level that bank weighs the retailer’s leadership status (𝜃) on the 
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Fig 20. The impact of 𝜃 on 𝐶𝐹 under three supply chain structures 
 For the retailer’s financing cost, some interesting results can be concluded in the 
following Observation 16. 
 Observation 16:  
1) The retailer’s financing cost increases with 𝜃 first till reaches the highest point 
(when 𝜃 is sufficiently high, 𝜃 = 0.08 in this numerical example), then decreases 
with 𝜃 under the Retailer Stackelberg, while it keeps unchanged with 𝜃 under the 
Supplier Stackelberg and the Nash Equilibrium; 
2) The retailer’s financing cost is the highest under the Supplier Stackelberg while is 
the lowest when the retailer is the price leader in the supply chain.  
Observation 16 can be explained as: 1) even as bank observes retailer’s leadership 
status more, it does not help the retailer to reduce its financing cost when retailer is the 
second mover. On the other hand, the financing cost increases first under the Retailer 
Stackelberg because both the wholesale price and the demand increase with 𝜃 . 
However, when the bank observes a high level of retailer’s leadership status, the 
financing cost of the retailer starts decreasing due to a lower interest rate; 2) when the 
retailer is the leader and moves first in the supply chain, its financing cost will be lower 
as the interest rate from the bank is lower.  
4.3.8 Hypotheses 
This study tests the impact of different factors on both the retailer’s profit and 
financing cost. Hence, in this section, I develop my theoretical hypotheses based on the 
discussions and observations above. 
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4.3.8.1 Retailer’s profit 
Hypothesis 7: 
1) All else equal, the retailer’s profit is positively linear with respect to the level that 
bank weighs on the retailer’s leadership under the Retailer Stackelberg while 𝜃 
does not affect the retailer’s profit under the Supplier Stackelberg and the Nash 
Equilibrium;   
2) The retailer’s profit is higher when the retailer is the leader in the supply chain as 
compared to the retailer’s profit if it is a follower.  
4.3.8.2 Financing cost 
Hypothesis 8: 
1) The retailer’ financing cost decreases linearly with the increasing 𝜃  under the 
Retailer Stackelberg and remains unchanged under the Supplier Stackelberg and 
the Nash Equilibrium;  
2) The retailer always has the lowest financing cost if it is the leader.  
4.3.9 The impact of the accelerating rate in the investment cost (𝒌) 
 In this section, I use a numerical example to illustrate the impact of the accelerating 
rate in the investment cost on the retailer’s profit (illustrated in Fig. 21) only since k 
does not affect the value of the supplier’s profit, the bank’s revenue, or the financing 
cost. For easy comparison and illustration, I set 𝛼 = 0.30, 𝑟0 = 0.15, 𝑏 = 0.50, 𝛿 =




Fig 21. The impact of 𝑘 on 𝜋𝑅 under three supply chain structures 
Interestingly, the retailer’s profits have a similar pattern under different supply chain 
structures. The results are summarized in Observation 17 as follows. 
Observation 17: 
1) The retailer’s profits decrease with 𝑘 under three games;  
2) When the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, it always benefits from the first 
mover and gains the least profit from the second mover, as 𝑘 increases.  
Based on the discussion, Observation 17 can be explained as: 1) due to a higher 
accelerating rate on the investment cost and all else equal, the retailer’s profit decreases 
quicker with k no matter who is the Stackelberg leader in the supply chain; 2) when the 
retailer is the price leader, it receives a lower interest rate from the bank. Thus, the 

























THE ACCELERATING RATE IN THE INVESTMENT COST




This thesis focus on the impact of different factors on both the retailer’s profit and 
financing cost. Hence, in this section, I develop my theoretical hypotheses based on the 
discussions and observations above. 
4.3.10.1 Retailer’s profit 
Hypothesis 9: 
1) All else equal, the retailer’s profit is negatively linear with respect to the 
accelerating rate in the investment cost; 
2) The retailer’s profit is always higher when retailer is the leader in the supply chain 














Chapter 5 Empirical evidence 
5.1 Data description 
 The dataset is constructed from COMPUSTAT. The financial information of 
suppliers and customers is obtained from the COMPUSTAT customer segment database. 
The dataset spans 1950 to 2017, with the main financial variables largely occurring 
between the years 1985 and 2014. After using a name-matching algorithm, the unique 
identification information for suppliers and their customers (retailers) can be found and 
a dataset containing financial information of retailers and their suppliers in each year 
can be developed. The market share of the retailers from largest to smallest in each 
industry for each year is ranked. Thus, the top 20% and the bottom 20% are identified 
as the market leader and the market follower, respectively. Based on the availability of 
data, I restrict the empirical analysis to 2,856 companies from 359 different types of 
industries. It is noted that all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
5.2 Variables 
5.2.1 Dependent variables 
 Based on the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4, I will determine how the retailer’s 
profit and the financing cost will react in various conditions. Five measurements have 
been established for the retailer’s profit. I first use the earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) divided by the sales (SALE) of the retailers; this is a measurement of operating 
profit (denoted as OP1, 𝑂𝑃1 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸
). Secondly, earnings before the interest (EBITDA) 
divided by sales (SALE) would be another measurement of operating profit. I denote 
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this as OP2 (𝑂𝑃2 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸
). Moreover, I identify the return on asset (ROA) either by 




; or by calculating net income (NI) divided by the total assets (AT), 
which is 𝑅𝑂𝐴2 =
𝑁𝐼
𝐴𝑇
. Finally, the net income divided by the total stockholders’ equity 




 I use the cost of debt to represent the retailer’s financing cost, which can be 
calculated directly by the summation of the total debt in the current liability (DLC), the 
total interest and related expense (XINT) and the total long-term debt (DLTT). The 
equation of the cost of debt (COD) can be found as follow: 
𝐶𝑂𝐷 = 𝐷𝐿𝑇 + 𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑇 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇.           (32) 
All the dependent variables are normalized by dividing by the total assets (AT). 
5.2.2 Independent variables 
 According to the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4, three factors that affect the 
retailer’s profit as well as its financing cost need to be investigated: the initial 
investment level on the marketing influence (𝛼), the level that customer can perceive 
on retailer’s effort on promoting its marketing influence (b), and the accelerating rate 
of the investment cost (k).  
 I measure retailer’s initial investment level on the marketing influence by using the 
advertising expense (XAD). The goodwill (GDWL) can represent the brand value that 
customers perceive for the retailer’s products. For the accelerating rate in the investment 
cost, I first find difference between the gross property, plant and equipment (PPEGT) 
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and the net property, plant and equipment (PPENT), and then divide the difference by 
the gross property, plant and equipment. The equation of accelerating rate of the 




.              (33) 
Similar to dependent variables, I also normalized all the independent variables by 
the total assets (AT). 
5.3 Empirical framework of analysis 
 After exploring on empirical study methods, I determine the regression 
methodology as the tool to start the empirical investigation. The basic regression model 
is as follow: 
𝑌1 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖) = 𝑓(𝛼, 𝑏, 𝑘) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝑒,   (Model 1)     (34) 
𝑜𝑟 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2
2 + 𝑒,   (Model 2)        (35) 
𝑜𝑟 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝜇1 + 𝑒,   (Model 3)         (36) 
where 𝑌1 is the dependent variable, while 𝑋𝑖 are the independent variables. 
 One of the crucial assumptions is based on the normality of the data. To achieve 
normality, after conducting some initial graphical tests that are not reported here due to 
space constraints, I establish that winsorization of the variables would be significant to 
eliminate any outliers in the dataset. For convenience, it is essential to note that all tests 
and analyses are performed after being winsorized and normalized to all the variables. 
5.3.1 Empirical result: the initial investment level on marketing influence (𝜶) 
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 I first test the influence of 𝛼 on the retailer’s profit (𝜋𝑅) and its financing cost (𝐶𝐹) 
when retailers are either the market leaders or market followers. To best verify the 
hypotheses, I use log transformation for the independent variable (𝛼). After I establish 
that log transformation is the appropriate tool to ensure normality of independent 
variables in the dataset, I conduct further empirical tests. 
The estimation results from the previous hypotheses are: 1) all else equal, when 𝛼 
increases, the retailer’s profit is non-linear with respect to retailer’s initial investment 
level on marketing influence; 2) when the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, its 
profit is higher. 
 
Fig 22. The empirical result: the influence of 𝛼 on 𝜋𝑅 (ROA1) 
Fig. 22 illustrates the relationship between the retailer’s initial investment level and 
profit. The retailer’s profit is measured as the return on asset in this case. The results 
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indicate that when the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, it can gain higher profit, 
as compared with the profit if it is a follower. Moreover, the retailer’s profit increases 
with its initial investment level on marketing influence first and then decreases. 
 
Fig 23. The empirical result: the influence of 𝛼 on 𝜋𝑅 (ROA2) 
Fig. 23 shows the impact of the retailer’s initial investment level on its profit. The 
retailer’s profit is measured as return on asset in this case. The results show that when 
the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, it can obtain a higher profit. In addition, the 
retailer’s profit is non-linear associated with its initial investment level on the marketing 
influence. 
 It is obvious from the above figures that the empirical results can reasonably 
explain the hypotheses 1 developed in Chapter 4. With more market power in the supply 
chain, the retailer’s profit will be higher because the retailer receives a lower interest 
rate from the bank. However, there is a non-linear relationship between the initial 
investment level that the retailer puts on its marketing influence and its profit. This 
result suggests that when the retailer starts investing on the marketing influence, the 
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impact of the marketing influence on the retailer’s revenue is larger than on both 
investment cost and financing cost. Therefore, the profit starts increasing first. As the 
retailer invests more, the impact of marketing influence on the revenue is less than that 
on the costs; as a result, the retailer’s profit then declines. 
When it comes to the estimation result for the retailer’s financing cost, there is not 
much difference between the log transformations variable and the original variable. 
Thus, I will illustrate the results only in terms of the original variable. The estimation 
results are: 1) the retailer has the lowest financing cost if it is the leader in the supply 
chain; 2) however, financing cost increases linearly with 𝛼. After testing the empirical 
data, the empirical results for the influence of 𝛼 on the retailer’s financing cost (𝐶𝑂𝐷) 




Fig 24. The empirical result: the influence of 𝛼 on 𝐶𝐹 (𝐶𝑂𝐷) 
Fig. 24 represents the influence of the retailer’s initial investment level on its 
financing cost. The retailer’s financing cost is measured as the cost of debt. The results 
demonstrate that when the retailer has more supply chain power, it has lower financing 
cost as compared to the retailer’s financing cost if it is a follower. Besides, the retailer’s 
financing cost is positively associated with its initial investment level on the marketing 
influence. 
This figure also illustrates that the empirical test can reasonably match the 
theoretical hypotheses 2 developed in Chapter 4 when the cost of debt (COD) is used to 
measure the retailer’s financing cost. Clearly, when the retailer spends more money on 
promoting its products, borrowing costs become higher as both the wholesale price and 
the demand increase with 𝛼. In addition, when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader in 
the supply chain, it has lower financing costs due to a lower interest rate. 
5.3.2 Empirical result: the level of customer perceived on marketing influence (b) 
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 In this section the impact of the level that customer can perceive on retailer’s effort 
to promote the products (b) will be investigated. In terms of the retailer’s profit, I 
conclude the estimation results: 1) all else equal, when b increases, the retailer’s profit 
is positively linear with respect to retailer’s effort on promoting marketing influence; 2) 
when the retailer is the leader in the supply chain, the retailer’s profit is higher. After 
the empirical test, below is the empirical results. 
 
Fig 25. The empirical result: the influence of 𝑏 on 𝜋𝑅 (ROE) 
Fig. 25 represents the relationship between the retailer’s marketing influence level 
that customers can perceive and the retailer’s profit. The retailer’s profit is measured as 
return on equity in this case. The results concludes that when the retailer is the 
Stackelberg leader in the supply chain, it can have higher profit, as compared to that of 
if it is a follower. Also, the retailer’s profit is positively associated with the marketing 
influence level that customers observe. 
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The figure demonstrates that with higher market power in the supply chain, the 
retailer’s profit is higher because the bank offers a lower interest rate. Also, when 
customers perceive improved store/product image resulting from the retailer’s 
promotion activities, the retailer’s profit increases as customers demand is higher. These 
empirical results support the hypotheses. 
Also, I want to test the relationship between b and 𝐶𝐹. The previous estimation 
results are: 1) the retailer has the lowest financing cost if it is the leader in the supply 
chain; 2) the financing cost increases linearly with an increasing b. The empirical results 
have been found as follow. 
 
Fig 26. The empirical result: the influence of 𝑏 on 𝐶𝐹 (COD) 
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Fig. 26 illustrates the impact of the retailer’s marketing influence level that 
customer can perceive on the retailer’s financing cost. The retailer’s financing cost is 
measured as cost of debt in this case. The results indicate that when the retailer has more 
power in the supply chain, it can have a lower financing cost, as compared to that of if 
it is a follower. Besides, the retailer’s financing cost increases with the marketing 
influence level that customers can observe. 
These empirical results show a good match with the theoretical results. The 
financing cost is measured as the cost of debt. That is, when customers perceive more 
effort by the retailer on the marketing influence, the retailer has a higher financing cost 
because both the wholesale price and demand increase with b. If the retailer is leader in 
the supply chain, it will benefit from its status by having a lower interest rate. Hence its 
financing cost is lower. 
5.3.3 Empirical result: the accelerating rate in the investment cost (k) 
 Finally, the relationship between the accelerating rate in the investment cost (k) and 
the retailer’s profit is tested. The hypotheses 9 I propose from the previous chapter are: 
1) all else equal, the retailer’s profit is negatively linear with respect to the accelerating 
rate in the investment cost; 2) the retailer’s profit is higher when the retailer is the leader 




Fig 27. The empirical result: the influence of 𝑘 on 𝜋𝑅 (OP1) 
Fig. 27 demonstrates the relationship between the accelerating rate in the 
investment cost and the retailer’s profit. The retailer’s profit is measured as operating 
profit. The results show that when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader in the supply 
chain, it can gain a higher profit. Nevertheless, the retailer’s profit is negatively 




Fig 28. The empirical result: the influence of 𝑘 on 𝜋𝑅 (OP2) 
Fig. 28 represents the influence of the accelerating rate in the investment cost on 
the retailer’s profit. The retailer’s profit is measured as operating profit in this case. The 
results indicate that when the retailer is the market leader, it can achieve a higher profit 
compared to that of if it is a follower. In addition, the retailer’s profit decreases with the 
accelerating rate in the investment cost. 
 After testing the linear regression model, the estimation results have a good match 
with the hypotheses 9 when the retailer’s profit is measured as operating profit (both 
OP1 and OP2). It is clear from the figures: when the rate that retailer invests on 
marketing influence grows quicker, the profit will decrease due to a higher investment 
cost; also, when the retailer has more market power in the supply chain, it will gain 
more profit since the bank offers a lower interest rate. 
5.4 Summary 
 After the empirical test, I find a reasonable match to all the theoretical hypotheses 
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developed in Chapter 4. Here is the summary: 
1) From the aspect of the retailer’s profit: all else equal, when the retailer invests more 
on the marketing influence, the retailer’s profit is non-linear with respect to retailer’s 
initial investment level on marketing influence; when customers perceive that 
retailer puts more effort on promoting marketing influence, the retailer’s profit is 
positively linear with respect to the level that customers can observe on the retailer’s 
effort; for the accelerating rate in the investment cost, the retailer’s profit is 
negatively linear with respect to the accelerating rate in the investment cost; 
2) From the perspective of the retailer’s financing cost: all else equal, financing cost 
increases linearly when the retailer puts more efforts on promoting its marketing 
influence or when the customers perceive that the retailer invests more on the 
marketing influence; 
3) In terms of the retailer’s leadership status: when the retailer is the leader in the 
supply chain, its profit is higher; besides, the retailer has the lowest financing cost 









Chapter 6 Conclusion and future work 
6.1 Conclusion 
 This research studies the impact of supply chain bargain strategies on the retailer’s 
debt financing from a bank. A supply chain in which there is one supplier, one retailer, 
and one bank, is considered. The retailer is budget constrained and requests loan from 
the bank. In return, the bank evaluates the payoff ability of the retailer and adjusts its 
offer of interest rate to the retailer. In this thesis, two factors that the bank considers in 
making the lending decisions: the retailer’s initial investment level on marketing 
influence and its leadership status in the supply chain. The rationale is that it is crucial 
for the retailer to gain more marketing influence to be the leader in a highly competitive 
market. It not only allows the retailer to set a higher price, but also helps the retailer to 
expand the market shares. In this way, when the bank needs to respond the retailer’s 
loan request, it will offer the interest rate based on retailer’s marketing influence and 
the leadership status as these two factors are commonly observed in practice. To sum 
up, the impacts of both retailer’s marketing influence and leadership status in the supply 
chain on the bank loan are investigated in this research. 
 To address the research questions, a basic single period cash flow model is 
developed. The model considers a supplier provides a product to a finance constrained 
retailer. The retailer needs finance assistance to pay the order payments to the supplier 
and to sell products to the customers. In order to gain more marketing influence, the 
retailer has to put effort on investing its promotion activities. Hence, the level of effort 
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that the retailer puts on earning its marketing influence and its leadership status can be 
perceived by the bank. As a result, the bank offers the interest rate based on the retailer’s 
marketing influence and leadership status. To best examine the impacts of these two 
factors on the bank’s lending decisions, as well as the financial performance of each 
member in the supply chain, the model is discussed in three different supply chain 
structures: 1) the Supplier Stackelberg game, in which the supplier is the leader; 2) the 
Retailer Stackelberg game, in which the retailer is the leader; 3) Nash equilibrium, in 
which both the supplier and the retailer have the same level of market power. For 
example, they are the similar in firm’s size. Based on the optimal solutions under three 
different games, the numerical examples as well as the empirical analysis are conducted 
to demonstrate the effects of marketing influence, leadership status, and other factors 
on the profits of both retailer and supplier, the bank’s revenue and the loan that the 
retailer can receive. Several interesting insights have been identified. 
The study reveals the retailer’s initial investment level on promoting its marketing 
influence affects both its profit and the loan it can borrow from the bank. From the 
perspective of the retailer, with more investment on marketing influence, the retail price, 
the wholesale price, and the demand increase. However, the retailer’s profit increases 
at first and then decreases. This result suggests that the retailer needs to find the balance 
between the benefit from marketing expansion due to the promotion and the cost it 
expends on. In terms of the financing cost, it keeps increasing with the marketing 
influence due to the higher wholesale price and the demand. Hence, this result shows 
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that the retailer also needs to deal carefully with the trade-off relationship between the 
higher marketing influence and the higher financing cost. In addition, when the 
investment cost increases quicker, the retailer’s profit decreases because the revenue 
that the retailer earns cannot offset the increasing investment cost. The insight from this 
result is that although the retailer has the goals to earn more market power and expand 
the market share, the pace that it invests on promotion should not be too quick. 
Otherwise, the retailer will suffer from the shortage of revenue to compensate the 
investment cost.  
For the supplier, the result indicates that the supplier benefits from the retailer’s 
investment. That is, the supplier’s profit keeps increasing with the retailer’s initial 
investment on marketing influence as both wholesale price and demand increase. Thus, 
the recommendation for the supplier is to encourage the retailer that invests more on 
gaining market power since it can achieve a higher profit. 
In terms of the customers, this research finds that when the customers observe that 
the retailer puts more effort on promoting its marketing influence, the retailer’s profit 
keeps increasing. The result provides the suggestion that the retailer should make a good 
plan on promoting its products through various advertising activities so that the 
customers can better perceive the product image. The result proves that these promotion 
activities can boost the profit of the retailer. Also, both the wholesale price and the 
demand increases if the customers perceive the retailer invests more. This can be 
explained as the higher customers’ perceived values, the more customers will buy the 
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products. With more demand, the supplier can charge a high wholesale price as the 
retailer will order more. As a result, the financing cost increases with the level that 
customers can perceive on retailer’s marketing influence. Hence, the implication of this 
result is that the retailer needs to work on a good balance between a higher profit and a 
higher financing cost when the customers observe and weight more on its marketing 
influence. 
 The bank has the highest revenue under the Supplier Stackelberg supply chain and 
the lowest when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader. Therefore, the bank prefers the 
retailer to be a follower in the supply chain so it can charge a higher rate of interest and 
increase its revenue. However, the bank has to endure the risk which the retailer has a 
great possibility that it cannot pay back the loan as a second mover due to the lower 
retailer’s profit and the higher financing cost. 
This study finds that the leadership status of the retailer in the supply chain plays a 
significant role. When the retailer is the supply chain leader and moves first, its profit 
is higher than it would be as a follower. This demonstrates that the retailer is able to set 
a higher price when it has more power in the supply chain. Moreover, the retailer’s 
financing cost will be lower under the Retailer Stackelberg supply chain because when 
the retailer is the Stackelberg leader, the bank will offer a lower interest rate.   
6.2 Limitation and future work 
 Although the models in this thesis provide with new insights on supply chain 
bargaining strategies, there are several limitations to this research and the current study 
90 
 
can be extended for future work.  
For the theoretical part, here are the aspects that future study can focus on. 
1) This thesis assumes there is only one supplier and one retailer and ignore the 
intensified competition in the capital market. Future study can extend the 
current model by adding more competitors in the capital market into 
consideration. It is worth examining the lending decisions the bank makes 
when the retailers are from different business types in a highly competitive 
market; 
2) The research results are tested in a single period time model. It would be 
interesting to investigate the bargaining strategy of the retailers with the 
suppliers and the bank under a dynamic model for a multi-period; 
3) The production cost is zero and the research ignores the transportation cost. In 
practice, such costs are always considered when executives make financial 
decisions nowadays. Thus, it may offer other managerial insights. Future 
extensions may include other costs, such as production cost and transportation 
cost in the model and provide the empirical analysis to capture such costs; 
4) The demand is assumed to be the same amount that the supplier produces to 
the retailer in this thesis. However, it is not always the case when the retailer 
sells out all products and has nothing in stock. It is common for the retailer to 
suffer from either out-of-stock conditions due to suddenly high demand or high 
inventory levels. An extension would be to consider that the retailer needs to 
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deal with inventory management to ensure the daily operation and minimize 
the inventory cost; 
5) This research takes only two factors into consideration that might affect the 
bank’s lending decisions. In practice, the bank may evaluate the retailer’s 
whole business package. The model could be extended by including other 
factors in the bank’s investigation, such as firm size and business viability.  
In terms of the empirical evidence, the limitation is summarized and future work is 
proposed as follow. 
This study uses the cost of debt to represent the financing cost for the retailer. In 
practice, the term cost of debt can represent the money that firms not only borrow from 
the bank but also from other financial institution. In other words, the financing cost that 
this research investigates is only partial of the real cost of debt. Besides, in the annual 
report, the loan that companies borrow from the bank can be distinguished in terms of 
several forms, such as amortization of discounts or premiums that are related to the 
borrowings. That is, the financing cost can be identified in a complicated way for the 
reality concern. Thus, future study could be extended to figure out a better accurate 
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